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Almraet--A method for constructing a class of public key cryptosystems is described. The method consists 
of composing a sequence of simple matrix transformations, some linear and some nonlinear. The nonlinear 
transformations may be as elementary aselement-wise squaring or cubing. It should be possible to 
construct a variety of such codes using this basic method. Furthermore the implementation of these 
cryptosystems aregenerally quite simple in terms of coding and decoding. 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of an encryption method in which encrypting keys can be made public, originally 
suggested in [1] and [2], has received considerable attention in recent years. There have been 
several methods uggested for producing a public key cryptosystem [3], best known of these are 
the RSA and the knapsack ciphers [4, 5]. The security of such systems rests on the computational 
complexity of solving certain mathematical problems. In particular the RSA code has spurred 
interest in algorithms for testing primality and factoring large numbers [6-10]. The knapsack 
cipher, at least those based on values xl  . . . . .  x ,  where x~ + • • • + Xk < Xk+l, are now known to be 
insecure [11]. 
The basic idea underlying a public key cryptosystem is that of a trap door function F such that 
F -  l is difficult to compute knowing only F, but such that the originator of the code can calculate 
F -  ~ because of additional information about how F was defined. Consider the following general 
scheme for creating a variety of such functions. Let F =f~ °f2 . . . .  fk, where o denotes composition 
of functions. Since F - t  =f~lo f~_~ . . . . .  f ? l  it is easy to find F -~ if the functions f~ . . . . .  fk are 
all known, and each of the inverses f 7 ~ is easy to calculate. However, only the function F is made 
public, not the individual functions f,.. Thus the cryptanalysis consists of trying to calculate F-1 
without knowing the f, or of finding the f~ themselves. Clearly the functions f~ . . . . .  fk should be 
chosen to make either approach computationally complex. 
For convenience, assume that the alphabet of the plaintext consists of s letters which are 
converted to the integers 0, 1 . . . . .  s - 1 by a simple substitution. The plaintext is now grouped 
into blocks of length n. Thus, each block can be considered as a vector X = (x~ . . . . .  xn) x of 
dimension n, where 0 ~< x~ ~< s - 1. Furthermore, it will also be desirable to carry out all com- 
putations in some finite field GF(p)  where p is a suitable chosen large prime. 
One of the simplest functions to consider is a linear functionf(X) = AX where A is a nonsingular 
n x n matrix. Computing f -~(X)  = A-~X is certainly easy. Of course if all of the fj are defined 
similarly, the product is also linear and publishing M =A~A2""Ak  makes calculating M -~ 
trivial. 
But if some of f /are nonlinear functions, the code becomes much more interesting. The nonlinear 
fj should be simple functions whose inverses are easy to calculate individually. However, by taking 
compositions with suitable linear factors, the function f can be made sufficiently complicated to 
make the calculation o f f -1  apparently very hard. 
CONSTRUCTION OF CODES 
Let us consider some very simple examples. For ease of notation A, B, . . . .  will represent the 
n x n nonsingular matrices [au], [bu] . . . .  and fA (X) = AX. If • denotes the Hadamard product 
81 
82 W.A. WL~n 
let 
(xl, x2 . . . . .  x. ) * (Yl, Y2 . . . . .  Y.) = (xm Yl, x2Y2 . . . . .  x.y. ), 
f2 (X)=X,X=X (2), f3 (X) .~.X ,X ,X=X (3)... 
Let F I (X)=fno(X+ V)ofA where V = [vl, v2 . . . . .  v.] T in a fixed, randomly chosen vector; 
F2 =f•°f2ofA and F3 =fn°f3°fA. 
It is now a routine matter to calculate explicit algebraic expressions for FI, Fz and F3 etc. 
For example: 
where 
where 
Fl (X) = [zl, z: . . . . .  Zn] T = Z 
Zk = ~ (dj(k)xj + ej(k)) (l) 
jffil 
4.(k) = ~ bkia O (2) 
iffil 
ej(k ) = ~, bktV i (3) 
iffil 
F2(X) = [Yl,Y2 . . . . .  Yn] r = Y 
yk -~ ~, ~ c~j(k )x~xj (4) 
jffiliffil 
cjj(k) = ~ bksaEj (5) 
h=l 
cu(k) = 2 ~ bkhahia,j (i < j). (6) 
hffil 
In each case, the coefficients dj(k), ej(k) and co(k ) need to be calculated only once. They are made 
public and are all that is needed to encode a message. Thus encoding a block of n symbols requires 
O(n 2) operations using FI and O(n 3) operations using F~. Similar coefficients are easily calculated 
for F3, only now O(M) such coefficients are needed to encode a block of n symbols. 
Decoding is accomplished by calculating the matrices A- i  and B -1. Then for example, if 
F3(X ) ---- [w I . . . . .  Wn] T ---- W; 
X = A - I(B-I  W) ~/3 
which requires two matrix multiplications and taking appropriate cube roots of the n elements in 
the vector B- IW. 
If the calculations are done modulo p and all cube roots modulo p calculated just once and then 
reused, decoding n symbols requires O(n 2) operations. 
Clearly, using functions such as F~ or F 2 would result in more efficient encoding, but these 
two functions uffer from other difficulties. For example, square roots are not unique modulo p 
in using F2. If calculations are not done modulo p, we would of course have other problems uch 
as square roots of potentially negative quantities, etc. However, since every number has a unique 
cube root modulo p, if p --2(mod 3), such difficulties do not exist using F 3 . 
Of paramount importance in any code is the difficulty of the breaking the code. As we will now 
show the codes based on F~ and F 2 are easily broken or of questionable security respectively. We 
will use Fm and F2 as examples of possible lines of attack on the general type of codes presented 
here. As previously mentioned, one way to break such a code is to discover the individual functions 
f~, f2 etc. and decode messages in the same manner as the author of the code. For F~ this means 
finding the matrices A, B and the vector V. A brute force approach would be to solve the 
simultaneous equations (2) and (3) where the bk~, aq and vi are all unknowns. 
A nonlinear public key cryptosystem 83 
At first glance this would appear to be a computationally difficult problem since none of the 
coefficients on the right side of the equations are known. Of course once A or B or V is founded, 
the others are easily obtained. 
However, the specific forms of these equations makes the breaking of such a code essentially 
trivial, since we do not actually have to know A, B and V in order to decode a message. Since 
the matrices BA and BV are both made public, simple calculations yield (BA)  -~ = .4 -nB-~ and 
(A -1B-n) (BV)  = A -1V. But 
X = A- IB - IZ_  4 -1V  
and both A - 1 B-  ~ and A - 1 V are now known by anyone wishing to break the code. 
Now consider the code F2. Calculating the individual coefficients ahj and bkh using equations (5) 
and (6) again appears to be computationally complex since all of the numbers on the right side 
of the equations are unknown. Does the special form of these equations result in an alternate way 
of decoding such as happens for the code FI? The fact that we are dealing with quadratic forms 
suggests the following approach. 
Each Yk is a quadratic form in the xi with coefficients cij(k). Let C(k)  be the matrix [cu(k)] and 
Mk = ½(C(k) + C(k)T). Let %(k)  = 0 for j < i. Straightforward calculation shows that 
Yk = XT Mk X" (7) 
Each of the n matrices MI . . . . .  M~ is individually easy to diagonalize. Now suppose that it is 
possible to find a single matrix P such that P simultaneously diagonalizes all of the Mk and also 
has the property p - i=  pT. 
Then PMkP-n= DK = the diagonal matrix diag[dl(k) . . . . .  dn(k)]. Hence, 
Yk = XT Mk X = XT pT Dk PX  = (PX)T Dk(PX) = Zr  Dk Z = dl(k ) z2 +""  + dn(k )z~ 
where Z = [zl . . . . .  z~] = PX. 
Letting di(k) = d,i and D = [dk~], we see that Yk is the kth row of DZ c2). Thus Y = DZ (2) so 
Z (2) = D -1 y which means that Z (2) and hence Z can be calculated. Finally, X = P - IZ  and so F: 
can be broken. 
This method for breaking F2 requires the calculation of the matrix P which simultaneously 
diagonalizes all the Mk. The problem of simultaneously diagonalizing two matrices has been 
studied [12], but it is not clear what happens for n matrices where n may be, say 100. 
Of course, the nonuniqueness of square roots in GF(p)  already makes the code F2 undesirable. 
The code F3 is much better in the sense that cube roots are unique [p = 2(mod 3)]. Also F 3 results 
in cubic forms in the x~ which suggests that the method of attack on F2 discussed above would be 
ineffective on F3. 
If one attempts to break F3 by solving the equations similar to (5) and (6) which define F3 instead 
of F2, by choosing n and p sufficiently large the number of possibilities can be made so large as 
to make such an approach impractical. Of course there is no guarantee that some more efficient 
method does not exist. Questions uch as this one, applications of this general method to other 
codes, and actual computer implementations of codes of these types are subjects for future study. 
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